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Abstract  
The last few years have witnessed a rapid growth in commoditization and consumption of IT services 
particularly due to the growing acceptance of cloud computing services. This in turn has led to newer 
forms of pricing the cloud services such as dynamic pricing. Infact, spot pricing, a dynamic pricing 
scheme has become mainstream. Cloud consumers using these schemes need to place their bids inorder 
to procure computing instances. Most of extant research on cloud dynamic pricing focuses on resource 
allocation problems and bidding strategies. We identify the need to look at behavioural biases of 
bidders to bring in a holistic perspective to cloud dynamic pricing discussions. In this paper, we 
conduct an experiment to elicit the impact of a behavioural bias namely, loss aversion, on a cloud 
consumer’s bidding behaviour. We discuss the social implications of our result to cloud consumers and 
the economic implications for cloud providers. 
 
Keywords: Cloud Computing, Dynamic pricing, Loss Aversion, Bidder Behaviour 
 
1.0   Introduction 
Cloud Computing is a new paradigm that comprises shifting Information Technology 
(IT) resources and software from locally independent computers to a more 
collaborative level (Hayes, 2008). This growing supply and adoption of cloud, which 
is perceived as the fifth utility has triggered the commoditization of IT. These services 
have transformed the way IT delivery happens in an organization. Consumers are 
aggressively pursuing this shift and Forrester predicts that the cloud computing 
market will cross $241 billion by the year 2020. Over the years, we find cloud 
adoption to be on the rise and research indicates that the emerging network of cloud 
players is expanding (Weinman, 2011). This is primarily because of the flexibility that 
cloud offers to organizations to meet variable demand without any fixed investment in 
capacity. This flexibility combined with the cost advantage has led to the growth of 
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cloud computing and today it not just attracts IT/IS users but also service providers, 
who see a huge business opportunity in selling cloud services. As large and mid-size 
cloud vendors try to capture greater market share, demand for robust and efficient 
pricing models is sure to increase. 
As the competitive pressures mount, it is imperative for service providers to 
look at the cloud market from a user perspective, particularly in the case of dynamic 
pricing market since the dynamic price is also a function of the user’s bid price. There 
is an implicit assumption that users who are bidders in these markets are rational 
(Mihailescu & Teo, 2010; Shneidman & Parkes, 2003). However in reality bidders 
can behave irrationally due to the influence of various behavioural biases that they 
may possess. For example, data from Amazon indicates that, at times, bids for 
computing instance exceed the standard pay-as-you-go (PAYG) price. Such 
irrationality could stem from the biases that a bidder may possess.  
The behavioural biases inherent to users could have important implications for 
IS decisions pertaining to cloud adoption and usage as well as in rendering cloud 
services. Our research specifically focuses on analyzing pricing and bidding decisions 
in the context of cloud computing in the presence of loss-averse users. In Section 2, 
we provide the research gaps and motivation. In Section 3, we summarize the 
background and related work. We discuss the dynamic pricing literature pertinent to 
cloud computing and the behavioural economics literature on key biases that could 
impact bidder behaviour with special emphasis on loss aversion. In Section 4, we 
discuss the context for loss aversion in a dynamically priced cloud services market. In 
section 5, we present the details and results of our experiment. Next we present the 
implications namely the social implications for cloud users and the economic 
implications for cloud providers. 
2.0 Research Gaps and Motivation 
A lot of research is currently taking place in the technical aspects of cloud and there is 
an urgent need for understanding the business-related issues surrounding cloud 
computing (Marston, et al., 2011). A search with 22 different keywords on 9 journal 
databases returned 2891 unique papers. Of these papers, only 32 comprised of pricing 
(Sowmya, et al., 2013) and none of these considered behavioural biases.  
On the other hand, research on behavioural biases in the context of pricing decision 
for the cloud cannot be waived of as irrelevant. A snapshot (see Figure 1) from 
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Amazon’s spot price video serves as an evidence of irrational bidding. We can 
observe from the chart that approximately 15% of the bidders quote a price much 
higher than the on-demand price and almost 0% quote a price less than 30%. 
 
For any viable business, economic models help in formulating the pricing and tariff 
structures to optimize return on investment, create critical mass of customers and 
manage resource deployment more efficiently. Current business models within cloud 
computing business case have been mainly studied and simulated for defining 
resource allocation algorithms rather than advocating and creating full-fledged 
economic models.  There are many unresolved issues such as, how to determine and 
create tariff structures with a view to evolving a sustainable business over a long and 
lasting period term? The assumptions in the current models need to be examined to 
improve sustainability. The current models that assume rational users need to be 
questioned and new pricing models need to be developed which account for the 
irrationality of users. As a first step in this direction, we examine the effect of a 
behavioural bias namely loss aversion on the bid prices in an online cloud computing 
market. 
 
3.0 Background & Related Work 
3.1 Pricing in Cloud Computing Markets 
Much before the advent of Cloud Computing, researchers have proposed online 
markets for computational resources. One of the earliest works is the Popcorn Market 
project by Regev and Nisan (2000).  Since then researchers have formulated many 
Figure 1: Snapshot from Amazon EC2: Bid distribution as a percentage of OnDemand price. 
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economic models for sharing computing resources. In the case of Cloud service 
providers, every provider has its own pricing scheme, for example, Salesforce uses 
“pay per use” scheme (Weinhardt, et al., 2009), Amazon uses “pay-per-use fixed 
pricing” (Amazon Simple Storage Service) and few others use “pay for the resources” 
that are assessed based on speed of bandwidth or amount of storage. According to 
Weinhardt et al. (2009), the most prevalent method of pricing in cloud is pay as you 
go (also known as the on-demand model or PAYG), which is based on units with 
constant price. Another common pricing model is subscription (also known as 
reserved instance model), wherein users sign a contract (subscribe) based on constant 
price of service unit for a longer period, say six months to a year. Obviously, 
customers and providers would like to use static and simple pricing models in order to 
ease payment prediction. Nevertheless, research indicates that dynamic pricing can be 
more efficient (Anandasivam & Premm, 2009; Mihailescu & Teo, 2010).  
3.1.1 Dynamic Pricing in Cloud Computing  
Dynamic pricing involves dynamically adjusting the prices of a product or 
service to customers, based on the value the customers attribute to that product or 
service (Reinartz, 2001). There are several works that have studied dynamic pricing in 
the context of cloud computing. Research shows that, users should bid optimally in a 
dynamic pricing scheme to achieve different objectives with desired levels of 
confidence in a cloud computing setup (Andrzejak, 2010). Few researchers have gone 
a step further and examined dynamic price traces and built models around that. Javadi 
et al (2011) have provided a statistical model of dynamic prices in a public cloud 
environment.  Dynamic pricing, in principle, encourages users to shift their flexible 
workloads from provider's peak hours to off-peak hours and thus obtain monetary 
incentives. An analysis of one year dynamic price data by Wee (2011) shows that it is 
reasonable for users to shift their workloads from PAYG to dynamic price since it was 
on an average 52.3% cheaper; however, shifting the workload to cheaper spot periods 
provides only 3.7 % additional cost savings. Research in dynamic pricing has led to 
the adoption of dynamic pricing schemes by cloud providers. Spot pricing is one such 
dynamic pricing scheme introduced for computing resources in 2009 by Amazon Web 
Services. 
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3.1.2 Spot Pricing 
Spot pricing enables users to bid for unused capacity, i.e. the capacity that remains 
with the cloud provider after fulfilling the on-demand and reserved instance demands. 
Instances are charged the Spot Price, which is set by the service provider and 
fluctuates periodically depending on the supply of and demand for Spot Instance 
capacity. Consider a bidder, whose has a certain valuation for executing a task on a 
particular type of spot instance. In a spot pricing scheme, if the bid price exceeds the 
current spot price, the instance is allocated until either the user chooses to terminate or 
the vendor initiates the termination automatically if the spot price exceeds the bid 
price. 
The spot market is like a uniform price auction of multiple homogeneous goods where 
each client bids for a single good which is the spot instance (Sowmya & Sundarraj, 
2013). The provider chooses the top N bidders. The value of N varies based on the 
supply (unused capacity at hand) and cannot exceed the available capacity. The 
provider sets the uniform price to the lowest clearing bid. All winning bidders pay this 
price for the cloud services.Though the above works have studied static and dynamic 
pricing schemes in the context of cloud computing, none of them have considered 
behavioural biases.  In the following section, we survey the literature in the domain of 
behavioural biases to contextualize our proposed research. 
3.2 Loss Aversion and other Biases  
Research on bidder behaviour started since the existence of auctions. One of 
the interesting aspects is to look at the various biases that can impact bidder 
behaviour. This section lists some of the common biases and particularly research 
done in the context of online auctions.   
3.2.1 Biases in Bidder Behaviour 
Deck et al have shown through experimental evidence that, an individual’s 
willingness to take financial risks significantly affects behaviour; the effect is 
particularly greater when the task is framed as a financial decision (Deck, et al., 
2010). For example, when a bidder is posed the question “If you do not want to lose 
XYZ you will have to raise your bids to $500”, the bidder is likely to increase the bid 
value (Ku, 2000).  This bias in behaviour is commonly referred to as framing effect. 
According to Bramsen and Martin (2009), bidders may feel a quasi-endowment effect 
towards the object for which they are bidding. Bidders can get a feeling of ownership 
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of the auctioned item during an auction and behave as if they are real owners. 
Behavioural economists Ariely and Simonson (2003) claim that, a low starting price 
can draw more bidders and these bidders bid relatively low because of anchoring 
effect of the starting bid  (reference price). In a recent study, Kuruzovich (2012) 
indicates that mental accounting can increase  bidder valuation over time. Dholakia 
and Soltysinski (2001), provide evidence of herd behaviour bias: in online auctions, 
bidders would herd behind other bidders even when choices did not reveal private 
information. In this paper, we investigate the effect of loss aversion on bidder 
behaviour. Section 2.3 provides details on loss aversion. 
3.2.2 Loss Aversion 
The irrational behaviour of bidders could stem from loss aversion - the 
behavioural tendency of individuals to perceive losses as more substantial when 
compared with gains of the same objective magnitude. When making decisions, 
people directly compare potential losses and gains and often give more weight to the 
losses (Benartzi, 1995; Kliger & Levit, 2009; McGraw, et al., 2010). This larger 
weight given to negative outcomes is attributed to loss aversion, i.e., “losses loom 
larger than gains” (Liberman, et al., 2005; Kahneman, et al., 1991). Kahneman & 
Tversky (1979) suggested that loss aversion be defined by −U(−x) > U(x) for all x > 
0. We can capture loss aversion using the following utility function: 
 ( )  {
 
 ( )                         
 
  ( )                           
  
 
where λ >1 is the loss aversion coefficient, commonly known as the loss aversion 
index. Loss aversion has been used to explain many effects observed in the context of 
decision-making. In the context of online bidding, Dittrich et al (2008) claim that an 
actual loss will change bidding dispositions more than an equally large gain due to 
loss-averse behaviour. 
Measuring loss aversion could have important implications for system designers. 
Researchers have established and observed qualitative support for loss aversion. Few 
studies have also performed quantitative estimations of loss aversions. Since loss 
aversion is a function of the utility for gains and utility for losses, to measure loss 
aversion both must be measured simultaneously. Research has indicated that until 
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recently, no clear method existed to measure loss aversion unless additional 
assumptions were imposed (Abdellaoui, et al., 2008).  
4.0 Loss aversion in the context of bidding for Cloud services 
Spot Instances enable users to bid for unused capacity. Instances are charged the Spot 
Price, which is set by the service provider and fluctuates periodically depending on 
the supply of and demand for Spot Instance capacity. Consider a bidder, say X, whose 
valuation for executing a task on a particular spot instance is $1. In a spot pricing 
scheme, if the bid price exceeds the current spot price, the instance is allocated until 
either the user chooses to terminate upon task completion or the vendor initiates 
termination upon the spot price increasing above the bid price. In this case, from the 
spot price history data we list the following scenario: 
Choice A: 99% chance of getting terminated before task completion if bid price = $1 
Choice B: 50% chance of getting terminated before task completion if bid price = $2 
Clearly X has to decide between the choices A and B. In both the cases, the spot may 
be allocated to the user if the bid price is higher than the current spot price and bidder 
X continues to hold the computing instance until the dynamically generated spot price 
goes above bidder X’s original bid price. If the new spot price is above bidder X’s bid 
price, it can result in X’s current computing instance allocation to be abruptly 
withdrawn. Research has indicated that most bidders might choose option B inorder to 
avoid losing their current spot allocation. This behaviour can be attributed to loss 
aversion (Kahneman, et al., 1990). In this paper, we intend to test the loss behaviour 
of bidders and its impact on bid decision. We test our hypothesis using a lab 
experiment discussed in Section 5. 
4.1 Hypothesis 
To validate the scenario discussed above, we raise the following hypothesis. Let A-
PAYG indicate a bid price above the on-demand/ pay as you go price and B-PAYG 
indicate a bid price below the on-demand/ pay as you go price. 
 
 H1: The Loss aversion index for bidders who bid A-PAYG price is higher than the 
Loss aversion index of bidders who bid B-PAYG price. 
 
Here For the purpose of testing the hypothesis, we collect user’s bids through a 
bidding experiment and measure the loss aversion of the participants.  
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5.0 Experiment 
To elicit the impact of loss aversion on a cloud consumer’s bidding behaviour we 
conduct a lab experiment to measure the WTA-WTP gap. The details and results of 
the experiment are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
5.1 Design 
In this experiment, we elicited the valuations of the participants using a market 
environment, wherein the subjects had to bid for computing instances that were 
limited in supply. We did not do perform practice rounds to avoid possible effects of 
learning. However, we ran two pilot rounds to ensure the flow and the sequence of the 
experiment are smooth. Based on the feedback received from the participants of the 
pilot experiment we revised the experiment, particularly the instructions and the post-
experiment questionnaire. 
5.2 Participants 
 
Figure 2: Participant Demographics 
 
One hundred and eighty two students with Graduate and Undergraduate background 
participated in the experiment. Participation was voluntary and individual. 
Participants did not receive any payment for participation. We gave oral instructions 
to all participants. In addition, we also provided the instructions in print form and on 
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the bidding screen. The profile of participants in shown in Figure 2 and gives the 
grouping based on age, gender, work experience and participant’s experience with 
game theory. We can observe from Figure 2 that most participants where between the 
age groups 21-30 and had no or very less work experience.  
5.3 Procedure 
The experimental conditions involved each of the participants placing bids for cloud 
spot instance once. A short briefing on how the Cloud spot market works was given. 
In addition, we gave instructions on paper along with spot price history data. Then, we 
asked to participants to place their bids on a virtual spot market designed for this 
experiment. We computed the results of the bidding and published it to the 
participants at the end of the bidding round. The next step involved calculating the 
loss aversion index.  
5.3.1 Eliciting Loss Aversion using WTA-WTP method 
The willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) method of eliciting 
loss aversion was established since 1980’s. One of the earliest works involving an 
experiment to test the WTA-WTP gap was by Knetsch and Sinden (1984). Coursey et 
al (1987) through their experiments established the large disparity between WTA and 
WTP. Kahneman et al (1990) report several experiments where the measures of WTA 
exceeds measures of WTP. The gap between WTA and WTP has been interpreted as 
evidence for loss aversion in riskless choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Since then 
several researchers have used WTA-WTP gap to measure loss aversion. Gachter et al 
(2010) measure individual-level loss aversion in riskless choices in an endowment 
effect experiment by eliciting both WTA and WTP from about 360 subjects. List of 
other works could be found in the reviews of Horowitz and McConnell (2002) and 
Sayman and Öncüler (2005). 
We adopt the WTA-WTP gap procedure to calculate the loss aversion index. The bids 
placed by the participants indicated their WTP. To elicit the WTA, the participants 
were given a post-experiment questionnaire. Here, they were asked to assume 
themselves as a cloud vendor and give a price at which they will be willing to accept 
to provide a cloud service. The participants were given instructions to assume the 
cloud service to be similar to the one they had bid for in the previous round. Using 
these two values, i.e., the WTA and WTP, we calculate the loss aversion index for 
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each participant which is a ratio of the corresponding WTA and WTP for that 
participant. 
5.4 Results 
 
 
Group N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
 A-PAYG 49 2.1833 1.45134 .20733 
B-PAYG 133 1.7268 1.08833 .09437 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  Table 1 gives the summary statistics. We observed that about one-third of the 
subjects belong to the A-PAYG group. We use the Levene Test for testing equality of 
variance (see Table 2).  It tests the null hypothesis that the population variances are 
equal. Since the resulting p-value of Levene's test is greater than the critical value of 
0.05. A value greater than .05 means that the variability in the two conditions is about 
the same and is not significantly different. Next, we perform the t-test for equality of 
means. The results are summarized in Table 3. The results indicate that the loss 
aversion index for above PAYG bidders vs below PAYG bidders is statistically 
different. The average Loss aversion index is higher for above-PAYG bidders (2.18) 
than the below-PAYG bidders (1.72).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Test for Equality of Variance 
 
 
t df Sig.  
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
2.284 180 .024 .45642 .19986 
Table 3: T-test for equality of means 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F Sig. 
LAI  3.029 .084 
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6.0 Implications  
6.1 Social implications for Cloud Consumers 
As can be observed from the results of the experiment, loss-averse users tend to bid 
higher. This could have a ripple effect on other bidders in the system. Although, one 
could view the cloud spot market as an economic setup it is also a social aggregate. 
The actions of a bidder(s) in the system could have an impact on the other bidders in 
the system since all these individual bidders comprise a social aggregate. The spot 
price is a function of supply and demand (see section 3.1.2). Loss averse users, who 
perceive “not winning a computing instance” as a loss, would start bidding higher and 
this in turn could lead to an increase in the overall spot price. Presence of such loss 
averse users could be disadvantageous to the other users in the system as they also 
face the increased spot price. This type of behaviour in a system comprising a social 
aggregate could be due to the collective action problem. Thomas Schelling talks about 
the Collective action problem, in his famous book “Micromotives and 
Macrobehaviour”, where he explores the relation between the behavioural 
characteristics of the individuals who comprise some social aggregate (Schelling, 
1978). Hence, the behavioural irregularities exhibited by certain users in a system 
could have an impact on the other users in those systems. 
Agents interested in addressing the above social situation could look at alternatives to 
overcome loss aversion. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993)  propose the power of 
aggregation method to overcome loss aversion. An application of this method can be 
found in Milkman et al (2012) where they propose policy bundling to overcome loss 
aversion as a method to improve legislative outcomes.  
 
6.2 Economic implications for Cloud Providers 
Psychological factors and behavioural regularities may have important implications 
on operational problems such as pricing (Su, 2009) . In an environment that comprises 
of bidders with various behavioural biases, the service provider can benefit by using a 
price update algorithm that computes the spot prices in a way that exploits the 
behavioural biases of the bidders. For example, by learning the ratio of users with a 
certain type of bias such as loss aversion, in the system, the service provider can alter 
the spot price to accommodate the irrational behaviour of this proportion of bidders 
and thereby increase provider’s revenues.  
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7.0 Conclusion 
Although large WTA-WTP ratios are well documented and also evidenced in our 
experiment, the findings do not seem to have had much effect on either economic 
models or discussions of pricing design for online computing resources. Current 
dynamic pricing schemes for the cloud are based on demand and supply only. As part 
of future work, we intend to develop dynamic pricing schemes which are based on 
factors that capture the behavioural biases of the users. Bidders could also possess 
other behavioural biases. In this paper, we consider loss aversion, however other 
biases such as anchoring (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), mental accounting (Thaler, 
1985), herding (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) need to be studied in the context of our 
current problem statement. Furthermore, the bid pricing and the dynamic pricing 
algorithms can be optimized by learning algorithms developed to detect and adapt 
based on the consumer’s biases.  
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